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COMMENTS

NLRB DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION: PLACING
INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES' STATUTORY RIGHTS
UPON THE SACRIFICIAL ALTAR OF OLIN TO
PROMOTE A NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
FAVORING PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

Collective bargaining agreements between employers and unions
generally provide for arbitration as the means for resolving labor
disputes.' Although arbitration has drawn considerable criticism,'
the Supreme Court has emphasized that the process plays a vital
role in promoting industrial peace and stability in the United
States.' Recognizing that arbitrators are better qualified to settle
1. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 541-42 (1976). Generally, collective bargaining agreements between a union
and an employer provide for arbitration as the last step in the grievance process. Id.
at 542. As Professor Gorman explains:
Complaints of contract breach ... are typically brought, by the union or the
individual grievant, to a low-level supervisor in the first instance, and if unresolved to higher levels of supervision. If the dispute remains unresolved at
the highest level of confrontation between union officials . . . and company
officials . . . it will be submitted to an arbitrator, voluntarily selected by the
parties to the contract.
Id. For a discussion of the arbitration process arising out of the collective bargaining
agreement, see generally F. & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d ed. 1973); 0.
FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983); R.
FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS (1965); B. MELTZER & S. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 1985).
2. Many commentators have challenged the arbitration system's ability to resolve labor disputes. See, e.g., P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW

(1966); Castle & Landing, Arbitration of Labor Grievances Brought Under Contractual and Statutory Provisions: The Supreme Court Grows Less Deferential to the
Arbitration Process, 21 Bus. L.J. 40 (1983); Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute
Resolution, 88 YALE L. REV. 916 (1979); Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report With Comments, 62
YALE L. REV. 115 (1964). But see F. & E. ELKOURI, supra note 1; 0. FAIRWEATHER,
supra note 1; R. FLEMING, supra note 1.
3. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). This
group of cases is known collectively as the Steelworkers' Trilogy. See MELTZER &
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disputes arising from the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements, 4 the Court is willing to defer to an arbitrator's decision
in order to promote industrial harmony.' The Court's reliance on
arbitration for the resolution of contractual disputes has encouraged
the National Labor Relations Board ("NRLB")" to adhere to the
deferral policy. 7 The NLRB has also extended its deferral policy to
allow arbitration of statutory issues, as well as contractual issues."
In over thirty years of exercising its policy of deferring to arbitration whenever certain procedural standards are met,9 the NLRB
supra note 1, at 925. Professors Meltzer and Henderson note five benefits arbitration provides in addition to providing an outlet for orderly protest:
(1) It frees unions from the need to repudiate the position of individual employees, and managements from the need to undercut supervisors.
(2) It enables lower levels of supervision to obtain management's consideration of a problem when intermediate supervision blocks such
consideration.
(3) It may educate each party about the weaknesses of its own representatives, the erosion of formula rules by practice, the failure of communication within the enterprise or within the union or between the union and
management, and the pressures and problems of the other side.
(4) It serves as a channel for resolving problems not covered by the
agreement.
(5) It often gives able and articulate employees an opportunity to show their
ability and qualifications for promotion within the union of the company.
Id.
4. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960). The Court noted that the "ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed." Id. at 582. The Court also observed that
arbitrators who are well-versed in the "law of the shop" can determine whether a
particular interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement will affect workers'
morale, thus affecting productivity. Id. But see P. HAYS, supra note 2, at 40. Hays
criticized arbitrators as generally being incompetent. Id. Hays noted that because arbitrators are dependent upon the parties for their future employment, the entire concept of arbitration is incompatible with a fair system of adjudication. Id.
5. United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 566.
6. See National Labor Relations Act ["NLRA"], 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-55 (1976). The
National Labor Relations Board ["NLRB"] originally was established in the Wagner
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 3, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
153-55 (1976)). The present parameters of the NLRB are set forth in § 3 to § 5 of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-55 (1976).
7. The NLRB first announced a formal policy of deferral to arbitration awards
in 1955. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See infra notes 20-29 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Spielberg.
8. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962), enforced sub
nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964);
Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
9. See Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. The NLRB distinguished Spielberg
from an earlier case in which it refused to defer to a prior arbitral award. Id. See
Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1961) (NLRB
did not consider itself bound by an arbitration award which was at odds with the
NLRA). In distinguishing the Monsanto case, the NLRB set forth three criteria
under which it would defer to arbitration. Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. First, the
arbitration proceedings must have been fair and regular. Id. Second, all parties must
have agreed to be bound by the arbitration. Id. Third, the arbitration award must not
have been clearly repugnant to the NLRA. Id. Subsequently, the NLRB added a
HENDERSON,
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has vacillated between two conflicting messages from Congress. In
the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act ("LMRA"),
Congress expressed its approval of a general national labor policy
favoring arbitration as the desired means to private resolution of labor disputes.1" Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act
("NRLA"), 1" however, provides that the NLRB's power to prevent
and penalize unfair labor practices1 2 will not be diminished by any
other means of adjustment created by "agreement, law or otherwise
..
..
,,'Thus, the NLRA expressly states that the NLRB's power
to remedy unfair labor practices shall not be usurped. The LMRA,
on the other hand, clearly indicates a preference for private resolution of labor disputes in a method agreed upon by the parties, including arbitration. Therefore, the NLRB must attempt to strike a
balance between the national labor policy favoring arbitration and
the NLRA's mandate of protecting individual employee rights.'
The NLRB may pursue one of three possible courses of action
when presented with an employer-union dispute involving allegations of an unfair labor practice as well as a contractual issue."5 In
the case of pre-arbitral deferral, the NLRB may order the contractually provided grievance arbitration where the parties have not prefourth requirement that in order to warrant deferral, the arbitrator must have considered the statutory unfair labor practice claim as well as the contractual issue. Raytheon Col., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), set aside on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st
Cir. 1964); Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), overruled, Olin Corp.,
268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
10. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act ["LMRA"] § 203(d), 29
U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). Section 203(d) of the LMRA provides that "[flinal adjustment
by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement." Id.
11. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
12. See NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). Section 8(a) of the NLRA lists actions by an employer prohibited as unfair labor practices. Id. § 8(a). Section 8(b) of
the NLRA lists union actions which constitute unfair labor practices. Id. § 8(b).
13. "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158) affecting commerce.
This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise .... Id. § 10(a).
14. Many courts have relied upon section 203(d) of the LMRA to approve of the
NLRB's deferral policy. See, e.g., William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council,
417 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974); NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 372-73, 378
(3d Cir. 1980)(Gaith, J., concurring); Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015, 1019 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1973). The NLRB has
also used section 203(d) of the LMRA to support its deferral policy. See, e.g., Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (1971); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 430,
431-32 (1963), enforced per curiam, 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 926 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327
F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). But see NLRB v. Pincus Bros.Maxwell, 620 F.2d at 387-89 (Gibbons, J., dissenting)(section 10(a) of the NLRA precludes NLRB deferral to arbitration).
15. Hayford & Wood, Deferral to Grievance Arbitration In Unfair Labor Practice Matters: The Public Sector Treatment, 32 LAB. L.J. 679, 680 (1981).
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viously submitted their dispute to the arbitrator."6 In the case of
post-arbitral deferral, the NLRB may recognize and thereby defer to
a previously issued arbitration award.1" Finally, the NLRB may review the grievance on its merits and resolve the issues itself."8 When
deciding whether to defer to arbitration, the NLRB must endeavor
to optimize industrial peace and simultaneously protect employee
statutory rights. 9
This comment will trace the development of the NLRB's postarbitral deferral policy from its seminal decision in Spielberg Manufacturing Co. through its current position in Olin Corp. It will then
provide an analysis of certain problems inherent in the current
deferral standard. This analysis indicates that the NLRB's current
Olin Corp. deferral standard will predictably draw considerable judicial challenges. This comment concludes that the present deferral
standard represents an abdication of the NLRB's responsibility to
prevent unfair labor practices under the NLRA. Finally, this comment proposes that the NLRB reject the Olin Corp. standard be16. Id. See, e.g., Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (NLRB deferred unfair labor practice charge to the arbitration process itself prior to any actual arbitral proceeding). In
Collyer, the NLRB stated that pre-arbitral deferral was appropriate where (1) there
was a long and productive collective bargaining relationship, (2) all parties were willing to arbitrate under the existing clause, and (3) the contract and its meaning were
at the center of the dispute. Id. at 842. In 1972, the NLRB expanded its pre-arbitral
deferral policy to cases involving section 8(a)(3) violations. National Radio Co., 198
N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). The NLRB reversed its liberal pre-deferral policy and overruled
National Radio in 1977. General Am. Transpor. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977)
(NLRB announced that it would not defer prior to arbitration in cases involving section 8(a)(3) violations). In 1974, however, the NLRB overruled General American in
United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984). In United Technologies, the
NLRB announced its most current policy statement that the Collyer doctrine will
apply to charges of violations of sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 559. As
in post-arbitral deferral cases, the NLRB emphasized section 203(d) of the LMRA
and the importance of arbitration in federal labor law. Id. at 558.
This comment will address only those situations involving the NLRB's post-arbitral deferral policy. For a discussion and general criticism of the NLRB's pre-arbitral
deferral policy, see Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty,
49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973); Henkel & Kelly, Deferral to Arbitration After Olin And
United Technologies: Has The NLRB Gone Too Far?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37
(1986); Johannesen & Smith, Collyer: Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. L.J. 723, 73841 (1972); Note, Collyer's Effect on the Individual Charging Party, 25 LAB. L.J. 561,
569 (1974).
17. Hayford & Wood, supra note 15, at 680-81. See, e.g., Olin Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 573 (1984); Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974),
overruled, Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980); Spielberg Mfg.
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). For a discussion of the NLRB's post-arbitral deferral
policy, see generally Henkel & Kelly, supra note 16, at 38; Moses, Deferral to Arbitration in Individual Rights Cases: A Reexamination of Spielberg, 51 TENN. L. REV.
187 (1984); Comment, Arbitration And NLRB Deferral: From Spielberg to Suburban
Motor Freight and Beyond, 20 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 785 (1984); Note, Spielberg Reconsidered-Problems in Application and Content of the Deferral Doctrine, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 1116 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Spielberg Reconsidered].
18. Hayford & Wood, supra note 15, at 680.
19. Id. at 691.
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cause proper application may sacrifice individual employee rights.

I. DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

NLRB's DEFERRAL POLICY

Although the NLRB began deferring cases to arbitration as
early as 1946,20 it was not until 1955 that the NLRB formally announced a deferral policy in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.21 In
Spielberg, the union claimed that the employer company had violated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA"2 by not reinstating four striking
employees.28 The company and the union submitted the dispute to
arbitration. 24 The arbitrator upheld the employee discharges on the
grounds of strike misconduct.25 The NLRB recognized and deferred
to the arbitrator's decision, and dismissed the complaint.26
The NLRB set forth three requirements that must be present
before it would defer to an existing arbitral award. First, the arbitration proceedings must appear to be fair and regular.2 7 Second, all
parties must have agreed to be bound by the arbitral award. 28 Finally, the arbitrator's decision must not be repugnant to the policies
and purposes underlying the NLRA. 5
20. The origins of the NLRB's deferral policy can be seen in two early cases.
See Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947); Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694
(1943), enforced as amended, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944); see also Note, NLRB
Deferral to Arbitration: The Evolution of the Spielberg Doctrine,23 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 291, 291-93 (1981); Note, Spielberg Reconsidered, supra note 17, at 1116.
21. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
22. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .
Id.
23. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. at 1081.
24. Id. The company and the union executed an agreement simultaneously with
the collective bargaining agreement which provided that the decision of the arbitration panel would be binding upon the parties. Id.
25. Id. The arbitrator found that during the strike, the employees who were
denied reinstatement used "profane, insulting, or vile language" toward the company
officials, workers and customers. Id. at 1084. The arbitrator held that such actions
constituted employee misconduct sufficient to allow the company to deny reinstatement. Id.
26. Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. The NLRB found that although it was not
bound, as a matter of law, by an arbitration award, "the desirable objective of encouraging voluntary settlement of labor disputes [would] best be served by . . . recognition of the arbitrators' award." Id. at 1081-82.
27. Id. at 1082.
28. Id. The NLRB reasoned that the parties must have agreed to be bound by
the arbitrators' decision where the four strikers, three of whom personally testified,
actively participated in the arbitration proceeding. Id. at 1081.
29. Id. at 1082. The NLRB noted that in an earlier case it had held that
"[tihere can be no justification for deeming ourselves bound, as a policy matter, by an
arbitration award which is at odds with the statute." Id. (quoting Monsanto Chem.
Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, 520 (1951). The arbitration award in Spielberg, however, was
found not to be "at odds with the statute." Id. See supra note 9 for a discussion of
NLRB procedural standards.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 21:323

Soon after its formulation of the Spielberg doctrine, the NLRB
realized that this policy would not sufficiently guarantee that the
arbitrator had addressed the unfair labor practice issue. 30 Therefore,
in Raytheon Co.,"1 the NLRB added to the Spielberg standard a
fourth requirement of proof-that the issue involved in the unfair
labor dispute had actually been presented to and considered by the
arbitrator."2 The NLRB considered the mere fact that the underlying factual issues in both the contractual dispute and the unfair labor practice allegation were factually parallel was not proof that the
arbitrator must have resolved the unfair labor practice issue. 3
The requirement that an unfair labor practice must have been
"fully and fairly litigated" in arbitration was repeated and refined in
Airco Industrial Gases-Pacific4 and Yourga Trucking, Inc. 5 in
1972. In Airco, the NLRB decided that it would not defer to an arbitration award where there was no indication that the arbitrator had
ruled on the unfair labor practice issue. 6 In Yourga Trucking, the
NLRB held that the party seeking deferral must carry the burden of
proving that the unfair labor practice issue had been "fully and
fairly litigated" before the arbitrator.3 7 Thus, the NLRB viewed the
issue of whether the unfair labor practice had been presented to and
considered by the arbitrator as an affirmative defense that must be
asserted and proven before deferral would be warranted.
Within two years of the Airco and Yourga decisions, the NLRB
sharply deviated from its course in deferral policy. In Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.,88 the NLRB held that it would defer to
the arbitral findings unless "special circumstances" precluded the
grievant from a full and fair opportunity to introduce evidence of an
unfair labor practice. 9 Under Electronic Reproduction, the NLRB
would defer even in cases where there was no indication that the
30. In a second Monsanto Chem. Co. case, a post-Spielberg decision, the NLRB
expressed concern that deferral to an award in which the arbitrator ignored the unfair labor practice issue would not promote voluntary settlements, nor the policies of

the NLRA. Monsanto, 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1961).

31. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d
471 (1st Cir. 1964).

32. Id. at 884-87.
33. Id. See infra note 100 for a discussion of instances in which factually parallel contractual and statutory issues are not legally parallel.
34. 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972), overruled, Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp.,
213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
35. 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972), overruled, Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp.,
213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).

36. Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. at 677.

37. Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. at 928.
38. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974), overruled, Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247
N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).

39. Id. at 761. Electronic Reproduction extended the deferral doctrine to situa-

tions in which a grievant could have, but did not, present evidence of an unfair labor
practice in the arbitration proceeding. Id.
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arbitrator had considered the unfair labor practice issue. Instead,
the NLRB adopted a presumption that the arbitrator's resolution of
the contract issue necessarily resolved the unfair labor practice issue
as well. 4' Electronic Reproduction shifted the burden of proof to the
party bringing the unfair labor practice charge. 4' Thus, under the
new policy, the NLRB would presume that the arbitrator had decided the unfair labor practice issue and defer to that presumed
finding unless proven otherwise."
The Electronic Reproduction decision drew sharp criticism in
the federal courts. 48 In response, the NLRB overruled Electronic
Reproduction, finding that it failed to protect employees in the exercise of their rights. 44 Returning to the deferral standard of Raytheon, Airco and Yourga, the NLRB decided in Suburban Motor
Freight, Inc.,' that it would no longer recognize the findings of an
arbitration proceeding under Spielberg unless there was evidence
that the arbitrator was presented with and considered the unfair labor practice issue. 46 Suburban Motor Freight again shifted the burden back to the party seeking deferral to prove that the unfair labor
practice issue was litigated before the arbitrator.'
40. Id. at 762.
41. Id. A grievant possibly could rebut the presumption that the arbitrator resolved the unfair labor practice claim if he could show "unusual circumstances"
which prove otherwise. Id. However, in the usual situation where the union controls
the arbitration hearing, a grievant might consider such a proceeding as an improper
forum to raise the unfair labor practice claim.
42. The NLRB reasoned that Electronic Reproduction's presumption would effectively preclude employees from "two bites of the apple." Id. at 761. The NLRB
was concerned that an employee might retain some evidence of statutory violations so
as to gain a second chance at litigation before the NLRB should the arbitral award be
disfavorable. Id. For criticism of the Electronic Reproduction standard, see Schatzki,
Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers:
Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 909 n.32 (1975); SimonRose, Deferral Under Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(a)(3) cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 201,
209-12 (1976).
43. See NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 1983); NLRB
v. Designcraft Jewel Indus., Inc., 675 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 673 F.2d 734 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp. 643 F.2d
465 (3d Cir. 1981); Pioneer Finishing Corp., v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983); St. Luke's Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d
1173 (7th Cir. 1980); Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977); Banyard v.
NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
44. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), overruled, Olin
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). The NLRB stated that "we can no longer adhere to a
doctrine which forces employees in arbitration proceedings to seek simultaneous vindication of private contractual rights and public statutory rights or risk waiving the
latter." Id. at 146. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (employees' section 7 rights under the NLRA cannot be waived during the collective bargaining
process).
45. Suburban Motor, 247 N.L.R.B. at 146.
46. Id.
47. Id. Suburban Motor Freight effectively restored the Airco and Yourga decisions. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of Airco and
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Four years after Suburban Motor Freight, the NLRB again
changed the standards of deferral and reallocated the burden of
proof in Olin Corp.'9 In Olin Corp., the NLRB overruled Suburban
Motor Freight, and allowed deferral to existing arbitral awards in
cases where there is no indication that the arbitrator considered the
unfair labor practice issue. The Olin Corp. decision rejected the
Raytheon "fully and fairly litigated" requirement in the interest of
revising the Spielberg standard to "more fully 'comport
with the
9
aims of the [NLRA] and American labor policy." '

The Olin Corp. decision retained the three Spielberg criteria 0
and adopted two additional requirements. First, the contractual issue before the arbitrator must be "factually parallel" to the unfair
labor practice issue.51 Second, the arbitrator must have been generally presented with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor
practice issue.5 2 Additionally, Olin Corp. places the burden on the
party seeking to avoid deferral to show that the standards for deferral have not been met.53 In order to meet this burden, the party
seeking NLRB review must show that the arbitral award was palpably wrong, that is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent
with the NLRA. ' Thus, the NLRB may defer simply because the
party seeking review was unable to prove what did not occur at the
55
arbitration hearing.

Yourga.
48. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). The Olin Corp. majority adopted a new deferral
policy based on the dissenting opinion in an earlier NLRB decision. Id. at 574. See
Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co. (Propoco), 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982),
aff'd, NLRB v. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 742 F.2d 1438 (2d Cir.
1983).
49. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
50. See supra notes 9 and 26-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
procedural standards set forth in Spielberg.
51. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The Olin Corp. majority noted that an arbitrator's award does not have
to be totally consistent with NLRB precedent. Id. Thus, to obtain NLRB review of
an unfair labor practice claim, a grievant must prove that the prior arbitration award
was inconsistent in every detail from the policies of the NLRA.
55. The Olin Corp. standard places the burden of proof on the General Counsel
of the NLRB. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 575. When presented with a grievant's
unfair labor practice charge, the General Counsel must determine whether there is
valid support to issue a complaint. Id. at 575 n.9. In a situation where the parties had
previously participated in an arbitration proceeding pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the General Counsel must defer to the arbitrator's award under the
Olin Corp. standard, unless he can prove that the award was "palpably wrong." Id. at
574. In most cases, however, the General Counsel will have little, if no, evidence of
what transpired at the arbitration hearing. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp., d/b/a The
Denver Hilton Hotel, 272 N.L.R.B. 4 (1984) (an employer representative of an arbitration panel testified before the NLRB to establish what evidence was presented at
the arbitration hearing).
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II.

APPLICATION OF THE

A.

Olin Corp. DEFERRAL

STANDARD

The Factually Parallel Criterion

The new Olin Corp. standard no longer requires the arbitrator
to actually consider the unfair labor practice issue in order for the
NLRB to defer to his award. The NLRB will presume that the arbitrator adequately considered the unfair labor practice issue if (1) the

contractual issue is "factually parallel" to the unfair labor practice
issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts
relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice issue."

As the Olin Corp. dissent argued, however, the majority's twostep rule involves actually only one step.57 Where the contractual
issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, it would

be impossible to prove under the Olin Corp. second step that facts
relevant to the unfair labor practice were not presented unless one
proves that the facts relevant to the contractual issue also were not

presented.5 s Thus, in reality, the NLRB will presume that both the
contract and unfair labor practice issues have been considered unless the General Counsel can prove that the two issues are not factually parallel.59 Depending upon how broadly the NLRB construes
the notion of factual parallelism, the General Counsel may be faced
with an impermissibly difficult burden of proof.6 0

The Olin Corp. dissent also noted that the new standard of factual parallelism is the same basis of the Electronic Reproduction
presumption that consideration of the contract issue simultaneously
resolves the unfair labor practice issue."1 Despite the substantial
s2
criticism and subsequent overruling of Electronic Reproduction
the Olin Corp. majority has returned to a standard that allows
deferral to an arbitration award under circumstances where there is
no indication that the unfair labor practice issue was even presented
56. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574. See supra notes 50-53 for a discussion of
the Spielberg doctrine.
57. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B., at 579 (Member Zimmerman dissenting).
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. As Member Zimmerman explained in his dissenting opinion: "Deferring to
arbitration on the basis of factual parallelism, of course, is a broader standard for

deferral than deferring only when contract and statutory issues are identical." Olin
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B., at 579 n.7. See NLRB v. Motor Convoy, 673 F.2d 734 (4th Cir.
1982) (court upheld NLRB deferral to prior arbitral award because the contract and
statutory issues were identical, thus implying that deferral would not be proper if the
issues were not identical).
61. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 579 (Member Zimmerman dissenting). See infra
note 100 for a discussion of situations in which resolution of the contract issue will
not resolve the statutory claim.
62. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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to, much less considered by, the arbitrator. 63 Thus, in application,
the Olin Corp. standard allows the NLRB to abdicate its obligation
under Section 10(a) of the NLRA to protect individual employee
rights.
B. Improper Allocation of Proof
In Olin Corp., the NLRB imposed upon the General Counsel
the burden of proving that the arbitral award was "palpably
wrong"6 before the Board would be required to ignore the arbitrator's determination and subject the case to de novo review. 5 Contrary to the views of the dissent, the Olin Corp. majority explained
that the NLRB is not returning to Electronic Reproduction entirely.66 Rather, the majority claimed to resurrect only the part of
Electronic Reproduction that placed the burden of proof on the
General Counsel to show that the arbitration did not warrant
67
deferral.
Under Yourga Trucking and Suburban Motor Freight, the burden of establishing that the unfair labor practice issue had been sufficiently resolved was placed on the party asserting the defense.6
Under the current Olin Corp. allocation of proof, what was previously an affirmative defense is now part of the General Counsel's
prima facie case.6 9 As the Olin Corp. dissent appropriately argued,
the General Counsel is the one party in the unfair labor practice
litigation who is not in privity with the collective bargaining agreement.70 It is unsound, therefore, to impose upon the General Counsel the burden of producing evidence about an arbitral proceeding
71
under an agreement with which he is not in privity.

III. THE FUTURE OF THE NLRB's PRESENT DEFERRAL POLICY
The NLRB's Olin Corp. standard for deferral to arbitration has
63.
64.
65.
Counsel
[NLRB]
review."
66.

Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 579 (Member Zimmerman dissenting in part).
Id. at 574 (citing International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 929 (1962)).
Id. at 575. The NLRB announced that the burden lies with the General
to show that there were "deficiencies in the arbitral process requiring the
to ignore the determination of the arbitrator and subject the case to de novo
Id.
Id. at 575 n.10.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 580. See Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972); Airco Indus.
Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972), overruled, Electronics Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213

N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
69. Olin Corp. 268 N.L.R.B. at 580. The General Counsel must prove that the
prior arbitration award was not susceptible to any interpretation consistent with the
NLRA in order to issue an unfair labor practice complaint.
70. Id.
71. Id.

19881

NLRB Deferral to Arbitration

already met with sharp criticism from a variety of commentators. 2
As the Olin Corp. dissent noted, the present standard is actually a
return to the previously overruled Electronic Reproduction policy."s
In light of the overwhelming judicial disapproval of Electronic Reproduction,7 4 the Olin Corp. deferral standard predictably will
arouse considerable challenges from the federal courts of appeals.7"
Three courts of appeals have expressly rejected the Electronic
Reproduction standard on its merits, 6 while several others have implicitly rejected it by approving the NLRB's decision in Suburban
Motor Freight.7 7 In Banyard v. NLRB, 7 8 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the Spielberg doc79
trine alone did not adequately protect employees' statutory rights.
The court held that, in addition to the Spielberg criteria, the arbitrator must have "clearly decided" the unfair labor practice issue.8"
The court further required that the issue must have been within the
72. A list of some relatively recent articles follows: Hendel & Kelly, Deferral to
Arbitration after Olin and United Technologies: Has the NLRB Gone Too Far?, 43
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37 (1986); Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB Deferral to the
Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV. 355 (1985); Comment, The Teamster Joint
Grievance Committee and NLRB Deferral Policy: A Failure to Protect Individual
Employee's Statutory Rights, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1453 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,
The Teamster Joint Grievance Committee]. But see Comment, The National Labor
Relations Board's Policy of Deferring to Arbitration, 13 FLA. ST. UL. REV. 1141
(1986) (viewing the Olin Corp. deferral standard as a stable policy under which collective bargaining agreements and their arbitration clauses should accordingly be
structured to enforce statutory rights of employees).
73. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 577, 579 (Member Zimmerman dissenting).
Member Zimmerman noted that the new deferral standard effectuates the same result as the Electronic Reproduction rule. Id.
74. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that criticized Electronic Reproduction.
75. See, e.g., Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986) (expressly rejecting the Olin Corp. deferral policy as inadequate to protect employees' statutory
rights under the NLRA).
76. NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 1983); Stephenson v. N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1977); Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342,
348 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
77. Suburban Motor Freight overruled Electronic Reproduction. 247 N.L.R.B.
at 146. For decisions approving of the Suburban Motor Freight decision that placed
the burden on the party seeking deferral to prove that the arbitrator heard and decided the unfair labor practice issue, see NLRB v. Designcraft Jewel Indus., Inc., 675
F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1982); Pioneer Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 199 (1st Cir.
1981), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983); NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643
F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1981); St. Luke's Memorial Hosp., Inc., v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173
(7th Cir. 1980).
78. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
79. Id. at 347. The Banyard court stated that it would accept the Spielberg
doctrine only in cases where the contractual and statutory issues were essentially the
same. Id. at 345. The court found that deferral to arbitration in cases where the contractual and statutory issues were incongruent would represent abdication, rather
than deference. Id. at 345-46 (quoting Local Union 2188, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 494
F.2d 1087, 1091 (1974)).
80. Id. at 346-47.
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arbitrator's competence."'
In Stephenson v. NLRB, 8 2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit adopted the Banyard "clearly decided" test."
The Stephenson court held that the arbitrator must have "clearly
decided" the unfair labor practice issue before the NLRB may defer." The court defined the Banyard "clearly decided" test as requiring that the arbitrator must "specifically deal with the statutory
issue."'8 5 The court held that the NLRB may not defer if it is not
possible to tell whether the arbitrator ruled on the unfair labor practice issue. 6 The Stephenson court concluded that Electronic Reproduction was invalid because it did not ensure that the arbitrator actually considered the statutory issue in addition to the contractual

dispute.87 Arguably, the Ninth Circuit will react adversely to the
Olin Corp. standard, which creates a presumption that the statutory
issue was decided unless the party seeking NLRB review can prove
otherwise.88
Judicial rulings in other federal courts of appeals indicate that
81. Id. at 347. The court added these requirements in an effort to keep contractual issues separate from statutory issues. Id. The NLRB could thereby retain its
jurisdiction over claims arising under the NLRA by requiring that the arbitrator have
clearly decided the statutory issue. Id. Additionally, the NLRB could presume that
resolution of the statutory issue was beyond the arbitrator's competence, unless the
unfair labor practice claim was substantially congruent to the contractual issue. Id.
See also Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Bloom Court stated,
"An employee does not waive his statutory right to be free from unfair labor practices
by virtue of his being a party to a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration
clause; he is entitled to a forum in which his complaint is fully and fairly litigated."
Id. at 1020.
82. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
83. Id. In adopting the Banyard approach, the court expressly rejected the
Electronic Reproduction rule as an unjustifiable extension of the Spielberg doctrine.
Id. at 537.
84. Id. at 535.
85. Id. at 538 n.4.
86. Id. at 537. The Stephenson court required that there be definite and substantial proof that the arbitrator was presented with and indisputably resolved the
unfair labor practice issue. Id. at 538 n.4.
87. Id. at 539. In elaborating on the Banyard "clearly decided" standard, the
Stephenson court stated:
Merely because the arbitrator is presented with a problem which involves both
contractual and unfair labor practice elements does not necessarily mean that
he will adequately consider the statutory issue, and merely because he considers the statutory issue does not mean that he will enforce the rights of the
parties pursuant to and consistent with the [NLRA]. The "clearly decided"
requisite is designed to enable the [NLRB] and the courts to fairly test the
standards applied by the arbitrator against those required by the [NLRA].
Id. at 538 n.4. See Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1980) (the Ninth
Circuit will allow the NLRB "wide discretion" in its deferral policy; however, in order
for deferral to be proper, there must be evidence that the arbitrator clearly decided
the unfair labor practice issue).
88. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the General Counsel's new burden of proof.
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the present NLRB deferral policy may meet with future opposition. s" The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit announced in NLRB v. Magnetics International,Inc."' that it would
uphold the NLRB's decision to defer only when the arbitration
award shows that the arbitrator considered and clearly decided all
unfair labor practice charges." The Sixth Circuit added that any
doubts as to whether the arbitrator addressed the statutory issue
would be resolved against the party seeking deferral.92 Similarly, in
United ParcelService v. NLRB, 93 the Third Circuit held that unless
the NLRB is presented with some evidence that the unfair labor
practice issue had actually been decided the NLRB's policy was not
one of deferral but one of abdication. 4 Thus, judicial precedents indicate that the NLRB does not have broad discretion to defer to
arbitral awards merely on the basis that the resolved contractual issue was factually parallel to the statutory issue.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
has recently rejected the Olin Corp. standard as giving away too
much of the NLRB's responsibility under the NLRA. 5 In Taylor v.
NLRB,98 the Eleventh Circuit held that the Olin Corp. standard
does not adequately protect employees' rights under the NLRA because it incorrectly presumes that, until proven otherwise, all arbitration proceedings confront and decide every possible unfair labor
practice issue.9 7 The court also criticized the NLRB for trying to
avoid its statutory obligations by adopting such a "far-reaching"
deferral policy.9
The Taylor court noted that under the Olin Corp. standard, ar89. See supra notes 43 and 76-77 and accompanying text for cases criticizing
prior NLRB deferral policy that was similar to present Olin Corp. standard.
90. 699 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1983).

91. Id. at 811.
92. Id. The court explained that it will not require evidence in written form
that the arbitrator was presented with and considered the unfair labor practice
charge. Id. However, the court refused to speculate as to what the arbitrator must
have considered. Id. Instead, it would examine the arbitrator's award itself to deter-

mine the degree of congruence between an award and the unfair labor practice
charges. Id.
93. 706 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 960 (1983).
94. Id. at 981 (quoting NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965, 969
(3d Cir. 1981)). The court noted that, although an arbitrator's award may "evince
resolution of unfair labor practice issues," a finding favorable to the employer does
not automatically dispose of an unfair labor practice claim. Id. at 981 n.23 (quoting
Hanmermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1080 (1983)).

95. Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986).
96. Id. at 1516.
97. Id.

98. Id. at 1520. The Taylor court noted that a deferral policy that presumes

that an unfair labor practice charge has been resolved in arbitration is insufficient to
enforce the policies of the NLRA. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 21:323

bitration awards have a nearly preclusive effect that is inappropriate
in any situation where contractual and statutory issues arise together. 9 The court recognized that in many instances, factually parallel issues are not necessarily legally parallel. 0 0 In such instances,
the Olin Corp. "factually parallel" test will result in inadequate or
no litigation of the unfair labor practice issue.1 ' The Taylor court
concluded that the Olin Corp. standard represents a reverse policy
too far in the direction of Electronic Reproduction, which insufficiently protected employees' rights under the NLRA.'0 3
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to review
the Olin Corp. standard, it has limited deferral to arbitration in
three other areas involving the federal statutory rights of employees. 103 In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,10 4 the United States Supreme Court recognized that contractual rights were separate from

the statutory rights granted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.108 The Court found that an employee's assertion of a con99. Id.
100. Id. The Taylor court considered four examples in which an arbitrator's
consideration of the contractual issue would be inadequate to resolve a factually parallel unfair labor practice issue:
(1) The facts relevant to establishing a contract violation may differ from
those facts relevant to unfair labor practice violations, although there
may be some overlap. Example: An arbitrator's finding of just cause for
an employee's termination may overlook a real underlying reason for discharge arising from some protected activity.
(2)
The standard of review for a contract violation may differ from a Board
for an analogous unfair labor practice claim. Example: The amount of
allowable insubordination by an employee differs for Board and arbitral
purposes.
(3)
The interest of the union may be to establish a favorable interpretation
of a contract, not to protect an employee from a specific unfair labor
practice. Example: A group of cases may be resolved jointly on a compromise basis, despite the wishes of one grievant to proceed with an unfair
labor practice complaint.
(4) A bipartite grievance committee issues a decision denying a grievance but
giving no indication of whether, and if so, what evidence or issues were
considered in reaching that decision. Example: The majority of Teamster
grievance committee decisions do not include written explanations, as
demonstrated in the decision to deny Taylor's grievance.
Id. at 1520 n.5.
101. Id. at 1520.
102. Id.
103. The Supreme Court has recently restricted the authority of arbitrators to
decide statutory issues in Title VII, Fair Labor Standards Act ["FLSA"], and section
1983 cases. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (Supreme Court
denied deferral to prior arbitral award in a subsequent section 1983 civil rights action); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Supreme Court held that the judicial forum can better protect FLSA rights than the
arbitral forum); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Supreme
Court directed the federal courts to allow employees to bring Title VII claims in a
judicial forum separate from their contractual claims in an arbitral forum).
104. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
105. Id. at 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act).
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tractual right in an arbitral proceeding should not preclude the employee from asserting a statutory right in a separate forum.' The
Court suggested that in a claim of a Title VII violation the district
court should admit a prior arbitration award,' 0 7but only accord it
"such weight as the court deems appropriate.'
More recently, in 1981 the Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Gardner-Denverto claims for wages under the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").'0 5 In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., 09 the Court reiterated
that individual statutory rights are independent of the collective
bargaining process. 1 ' In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted
-that a union may sacrifice an individual employee's statutory claim
during arbitration as a compromise for the benefit of the overall
union membership."' Additionally, an arbitrator may not be competent to adequately interpret the legal complexities of the FLSA."'
Finally, the Court recognized that the arbitrator may not have the
authority to grant the grievant the type of relief that a court could
grant."8
In McDonald v. City of West Branch,"4 the Supreme Court applied the Gardner-Denver and Barrentine decisions to a Section
1983 civil rights action." 5 The Court set forth four arguments de106. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51.
107. Id. at 60. The Court stated that a trial court can give great weight to an
arbitrator's award, if the arbitrator has fully considered the Title VII claim. Id. at 60
n.21. However, the Court noted:
The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke public laws that
conflict with the bargain between the parties . . . . If an arbitral decision is
based "solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation," rather than on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement,
the arbitrator has "exceeded the scope of the submission," and the award will
not be enforced.
Id. at 53 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
108. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982) (Fair Labor Standards Act).
109. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
110. Id. at 745.
111. Id. at 742. See supra note 100 for a discussion of the Taylor court's observation that a union is responsible to its membership as a whole.
112. Id. at 742-43. The Court noted that arbitrators are competent as "primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land." Id. (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S.
at 57). The Court further noted that even if the arbitrator is competent, he is bound
to effectuate the parties' intent under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. Therefore, the arbitrator might not have the contractual authority to decide statutory issues. Id.
113. Id. at 745.
114. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
115. Id. at 289. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1984). Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
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rived from the Gardner-Denverand Barrentine opinions as the basis for refusing to give preclusive effect to a prior arbitral award.
First, an arbitrator whose expertise "pertains primarily to the law of
the shop" may not be competent to resolve complex legal questions.
Second, an arbitrator may lack authority to enforce statutes because
his authority derives solely from the contract. Third, the union,
which usually has exclusive control over the grievant's claims in arbitration, may sacrifice the employee's statutory rights in the interest of the union as a whole. Finally, arbitral fact-finding generally is
not the same as judicial fact-finding."1 '
The Gardner-Denver, Barrentine and McDonald decisions
show that the Supreme Court has recognized a need for individual
employees to be able to assert statutory rights independent of the
arbitration process. Although the Supreme Court has not yet had
the opportunity to review the Olin Corp. standard, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recently stated
that the rationale of Barrentinewould apply to NLRA cases. 11 7 The
United States Supreme Court may soon have the opportunity to extend its views on post-arbitral deferral to the NLRA, when the Olin
Corp. standard meets with the anticipated federal courts' challenges.
CONCLUSION

The NLRB's ruling in Olin Corp. represents an abdication of its
responsibility to remedy unfair labor practices and protect individual employee rights under the NLRA. Under Olin Corp., the NLRB
has adopted a policy that deferral to arbitration is proper in all
cases, unless there is proof that some unusual circumstances require
an independent investigation into a grievant's statutory claims. Olin
Corp.'s standard for deferral fails to protect employee rights adeof any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.

Id.
116. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 287. See Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1521

(11th Cir. 1986). The Taylor court stated that "arbitration could not provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating claims under [federal] statutes." Id. (quoting McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289); McNair v. United States Postal Service, 768 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing the need for a forum independent of
the arbitration process for employees to assert statutory rights).
117. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, Cleveland Local, AFLCIO (AFTRA) v. Store Broadcasting Co., 745 F.2d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 1984). See also
Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 749 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Barrentine Court majority, in refusing to distinguish between Gardner-Denverand Barrentine,implicitly rejected Chief Justice Burger's argument in dissent that the Civil Rights Act protected
much more important rights than those of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 74546 (majority opinion). See Peck, supra note 72, at 386. Perhaps the Supreme Court
might also refuse to see a distinction between FLSA and NLRA cases sufficient to
warrant deferral to arbitration in the latter.
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quately in situations where contractual and statutory issues are factually parallel, yet involve distinct elements of proof.1 8 The NLRB
has improperly expanded its deferral policy to a point where employees are precluded from litigating their NLRA righti within the
forum that Congress has expressly provided for such purposes.
The NLRB should recognize that the arbitrator's expertise lies
in the law of the shop. For this reason, the arbitrator is best suited
to interpret contracts and the intent of the drafters, thereby resolving disputes that arise under collective bargaining agreements. The
NLRB's expertise lies in the resolution of legal questions that arise
under the NLRA. The NLRB, therefore, should accept its obligation
of protecting employees' statutory rights through the established
procedure of an administrative law hearing with NLRB review. 1
The NLRB could achieve this result by distinguishing between
grievances involving individual statutory rights and those involving
collective rights."20 The NLRB should defer to prior arbitral awards
involving collective rights because, in such a case, the arbitrator is
better suited to interpret the meaning of a collective bargaining
agreement. The NLRB should refuse to defer, however, in cases involving the individual statutory rights of an employee presenting an
unfair labor practice charge. In applying this method, the NLRB
may achieve a balance between the general national labor policy
favoring arbitration as the desired means of resolving labor disputes
and the NLRA's mandate to protect individual employee rights.
Craig Dow Patton

118. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of instances
where factually parallel contractual and statutory issues are not legally parallel.
119. See NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
120. See Comment, The Teamster Joint Grievance Committee, supra note 72,
at 1457.

